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Modelling How People Learn in Games

Computational Thinking Seminar
Ed Hopkins

Computing Nash equilibria in games is complex. Yet, economists still hope that such equilibria can be used to predict human behaviour in a range of economic and social situations. One possible reason for the validity of this approach is that by following simple adaptive rules people can find their way to equilibrium. Recent advances in the theory of learning in games shows that this can be the case. The talk will be an introduction to the theory and some remaining unresolved issues. More on

Following the talk, there will be an informal reception of wine and nibbles in G.03 to promote discussion and interaction. You are very welcome to attend this. Feel free to circulate this announcement to anyone you think will be interested. More information about this series, including how to sign up to get future announcements, can be found at

Date and time: 
Wednesday, 6 August, 2008 - 16:00
60 minutes